In Canada and around the world, a little-considered industry is dying a slow death. The Canadian government can save and revitalize this industry, and perhaps spur a new technologies revolution in the Great White North. What would require this change? The Canadian government would simply need to ensure that the intentions of a well-meaning group of diverse government representatives are carried out and not distorted, at least in Canada.
In the last two decades governments and private entities around the world have funneled significant resources into the detection and prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. Like many other countries, Canada’s Department of Treasury established a national agency to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (“FINTRAC”) is Canada’s financial intelligence unit, created to collect, analyze and disclose financial intelligence on suspected money laundering and terrorist financing activities. FINTRAC regulates life insurance companies, securities dealers, casinos, banks and others, including the lowliest of financial services providers, money services businesses (“MSBs”). MSBs are usually providers of alternative financial services, such as currency exchangers, cheque cashers and money transmitters like Western Union.
FINTRAC may impose significant penalties on MSBs, banks and other financial services companies (“Financial Institutions”) with deficient anti-money laundering controls. While FINTRAC’s fines to date have not been intimidatingly large, financial services companies of all stripes are subject to fines which may run into the millions of dollars, as well as criminal prosecution of senior management, which could lead to prison time.
The threat of fines, prison and reputational damage resulting from a poor FINTRAC audit result looms over Financial Institutions. In particular, the people at Financial Institutions tasked with ensuring a predictable and glowing FINTRAC audit result are the daily grinders in their compliance departments. While other Financial Institutions staff members, such as commercial lenders, traders of all stripes and C-suite executives perform their jobs with a dual focus on risk and reward, compliance department staff sees the world more starkly. They balance risk and more risk. The first risk is the actual risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. The second risk is the risk of fines and reputational damage to their institution. Each poses a material risk to their employment – the third risk.
As a result of this institutional reality, all business deemed to have a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing is turned away. Who decides where this high risk business is to be found? The Financial Action Task Force (the “FATF”) does. The FATF is “an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies, both at national and international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing”. The Task Force is therefore a policy-making body and its policies have become dogma. These policies include a set of guidelines known as the FATF Recommendations and the FATF Special Recommendations (collectively the “Recommendations”). A critical component of the Recommendations is the running theme imploring Financial Institutions to perform customer due diligence, also known as know-your-customer reviews (“CDD” or “KYC”). An emphasis is placed on the value of face-to-face business relationships.
Special Recommendation VI places a clear target on “money or value transfer services” (read: MSBs), which “have shown themselves vulnerable to misuse for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes.” Special Recommendation VI goes on to recommend that MSBs be regulated, which is reasonable enough. However, the MSB industry’s reputation was decimated when the FATF described MSBs as “vulnerable to misuse”. Perhaps with the exception of 800 pound gorillas such as Moneygram, Western Union and Pay Pal, MSBs became the scourge of Financial Institutions the world over. “Vulnerable to misuse” became “risky”, which became “high risk”, which became “not worth losing my job over – sorry tourists, you’ll have to pay a king’s ransom to exchange money at your hotel” (hotels never register as MSBs even though they probably should); and “sorry online MSBs other than Pay Pal, you must live in constant fear of losing your banking relationships.” The fact that the Recommendations merely promote regulation as a preferred policy somehow got lost in the shuffle. In recent years many, many MSBs have dissolved as a result of lost banking relationships. Parties wishing to establish new MSBs have found it virtually impossible to find a banking partner, not only in Canada, but in most first world countries.
Let’s assume the Financial Institutions, and the people running their compliance departments are correct in every way. The risk of providing banking services to MSBs is usually not worth the limited revenue that may come from an MSB other than the 800 pound gorillas. If something goes awry, someone could lose a job by failing to terminate the services provided to a company labeled ‘high risk’.
Can anyone do anything to assist Canada’s helpless, honest and tarnished MSBs? In this case, the governmental agencies that participated in drafting the Recommendations can step in to support their own policies. After all, the Recommendations provide that MSBs should be regulated, not decimated.
The FATF website lists a number of Canadian governmental agencies as participants in the FATF. These include the Department of Finance, the CRA, the RCMP and many others. What if the Department of Finance or FINTRAC were willing to indemnify Financial Institutions against any liability resulting from their dealings with regulated Canadian MSBs? As a policy matter, what effects would this have? Probably good ones, including:
- More small and honest MSBs would be able to keep their banking relationships and stay in business
- Some informal MSBs may register with FINTRAC
- New MSBs would receive banking services, keeping money transfer and foreign exchange prices lower for consumers and creating some degree of competitiveness among MSBs
- Canada could become a launching point for new MSBs with a focus on new technologies – e-wallet and m-wallet companies might pass over foreign jurisdictions with larger populations to first open their doors in Canada because of its reasonable regulatory environment
- Financial Institutions would have no risk from their dealings with companies regulated by FINTRAC; if an MSB is found to have facilitated money laundering or terrorist financing FINTRAC can shut it down and penalize the MSB’s owners and staff appropriately
Currently, FINTRAC audits MSBs sporadically. This leaves the compliance departments of financial institutions relegated to a place where they can only hope that their MSB clients are not being used for money laundering or terrorist financing. However, if an MSB could voluntarily subject itself to frequent FINTRAC audits, bi-annually, quarterly, etc., then the Financial Institutions could take comfort that the government watchdog is ensuring that MSB best practices are followed. MSBs may even be willing to pay for increased audits as a form of insurance against lost banking relationships. In this situation, Financial Institutions would almost certainly welcome back MSBs.
In conclusion, the FATF’s Recommendations provide that MSBs should be regulated because they are vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing. This Recommendation has led Financial Institutions compliance departments to stop their institutions from accepting MSBs as new customers, and in many cases, to terminate their existing relationships with MSBs. If Canada’s representatives on the FATF are serious about the policy of regulating MSBs instead of destroying MSBs, then they could save the industry’s smaller and Canadian-headquartered players by simply indemnifying Financial Institutions from any penalties resulting from providing services to regulated MSBs. The Department of Treasury could add one simple line to the Regulations: “No Financial Institutions shall be fined or otherwise penalized under these Regulations for providing services to a regulated money services business”. The result of ensuring that the Recommendations are carried out as intended would result in a more diverse and therefore stronger financial services industry in Canada.